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THE GENERAL, THE PRIME 
MINISTER AND THE IMAM: 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
 IN TURKEY TODAY
Sami Faltas*
The Turkish government has won its power struggle with the General Staff. 
Now that the primacy of politics has been established, democratic control of 
the military has improved. However, the government now faces a challenge 
of a different nature. Behind the scenes, conservative Islamic movements are 
exercising strong influence on parts of the security sector. Now Turkey needs 
to strengthen oversight of the government by state bodies, an independent 
judiciary, free media, and civil society. Such oversight can only be success-
ful under the rule of law. If Turkey does not transform itself now into a fully-
fledged democracy, it will slide backward toward authoritarian rule.
* Dr. Sami Faltas works for Groningen University, the Netherlands; he is the former director of the Centre for European Security Studies. 
(www.cess.org)
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very year on 30 August, Turkey celebrates its 1922 military victory 
against Greece. Victory Day highlights the role of the military forces in 
Turkey’s modern history and the value that Turks attach to their army. 
To use Goltz Pasha’s phrase, this day portrays Turkey as a “nation in 
arms”.1 Celebrations include military parades, the promotion of officers, torchlight 
processions and jet fighters painting the sky crimson and white. Additionally, many 
leading figures of government and society used to visit the Turkish General Staff 
(Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, or GKB) and pay their respects to its chief on this day.
All of this, however, changed in 2011. On 29 July, the four chief commanders of 
the Turkish armed forces resigned in order to protest the arrest of officers accused 
of plotting against the government. They said those arrests were illegal and based 
on fake documents.2 Within a few days, General Necdet Özel had been appointed 
as the Chief General Staff commander and promptly suggested that President 
Abdullah Gül should receive the country’s congratulations on Victory Day. This 
became the new protocol.
So now, Turkey’s top-ranking soldier goes to pay tribute to the President of the 
Republic, who is also his Commander in Chief. A press photograph taken on 
Victory Day in 2011 showed General Özel bowing to the man whose election to 
the presidency the military had objected to four years earlier.3 It was a sign of the 
times.
During the past few years, the Turkish 
government has increasingly asserted 
its authority over the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TSK), whose political influence 
has waned. The TSK’s role in decision 
making through institutions such as 
the National Security Council has 
diminished. The TSK has stopped 
pronouncing its opinion on foreign policy issues, ethnic minorities, education and 
secularism. Its role as an autonomous player in Turkish politics is over.
Today, hundreds of senior officers are in jail, waiting to be tried for alleged crimes 
against the state. If the rule of law was firmly established in Turkey, innocent officers 
would have little to fear. What has been happening in reality, though, is that soldiers, 
1 Wilhelm Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz was a German Field Marshall; in 1883, at the request of Sultan Hamid, he came to reorganize 
the Ottoman army. In 1883, he published Das Volk in Waffen, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 238118/Colmar-baron-von-der-Goltz, 13 April 2012.
2 Constanze Letsch, “Turkey military chiefs resign over Sledgehammer ‘coup plot’ arrests”, The Guardian, 13 April 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/30/turkey-military-chiefs-resign-sledgehammer
3  “New rules in place: President receives Victory Day greetings”, Today’s Zaman, 30 August 2011.
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journalists and other critics of the ruling party (or its political friends) risk being held 
in detention for a long time before they are tried or released without explanation. 
The charges against them often sound vague and contrived. Finally, the courts 
with “special powers” which are trying these people are widely suspected of not 
being impartial. Two prominent cases come to mind.
The investigative journalist Ahmet Şık was arrested and jailed in March 2011 as he 
was preparing to publish a book called The Army of the Imam about the influence 
of the Fethullah Gülen movement over the Turkish police. One year later, when an 
Istanbul court ordered his release, Şık was freed without any explanation.4 However, 
100 more journalists remain in prison. Both the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe recently issued reports 
expressing their concern about the imprisonment of journalists in Turkey.
Retired general İlker Başbuğ, Chief of Staff from 2008 to 2010, is currently on trial, 
accused of being a leader of the “Ergenekon terrorist organization” while he was the 
head of the TSK. He also faces charges of spreading anti-governmental propaganda 
on the Internet.5 Turkish commentators, foreign diplomats and the author of this 
article find the terrorism charges hard to believe. If they are accurate, this would 
raise embarrassing questions about the role of Prime Minister Erdoğan who was 
General Başbuğ’s political superior when the latter was supposedly leading a 
terrorist organization. But the accusation is too odd to be taken seriously. This article 
certainly does not intend to prejudge the outcome of this case. Not even a chief of 
staff is above the law. However, this case seems like a political settling of scores.
The Şık and Başbuğ affairs are two in a series of legal cases that are causing concern 
about the rule of law and the independence of the judicial system in Turkey. Gareth 
Jenkins is among the analysts who have highlighted serious mistakes and bad 
practices in the handling of the criminal investigations concerning the Ergenekon 
affair. “This is not to say,” he adds, “that the Ergenekon investigation is simply a 
politically motivated fabrication.”6
It is not hard to imagine the anger of the Turkish military when senior commanders 
are arrested and prosecuted. No one expects, however, that the TSK will topple 
the government, as it did four times between 1961 and 1997. On 29 July 2011, 
when they could no longer live with the decisions of their political superiors, Turkey’s 
leading military officials did not attack the government. They resigned – the correct 
thing to do in a democracy.
4 Imamın Ordusu is available in Turkish at http://theopinions.info/tr/imaminordusu.pdf 
Summaries in English are at http://www.tuerkeiforum.net/enw/index.php/
5 “The Başbuğ Case”, Hürriyet Daily News, 28 March 2012.
6 Gareth Jenkins, Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation, (Washington D.C. and Stockholm: Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute & Silk Road Studies Program), 2009, p. 11.
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 EU Accession and Civil-Military Relations
It is often assumed that the main incentive behind Turkey’s civil-military reforms was 
the prospect of  EU accession and the need to fulfill the EU’s political requirements 
which are known as the Copenhagen Criteria.
The annual reports of the European Commission and the European Parliament 
on Turkey’s progress towards accession always contain detailed observations 
and recommendations on civil-military relations. There is no doubt that the policy 
makers in Ankara take these reports into serious consideration. This article claims, 
however, that these reports may not have been the main factor behind the reforms 
in civil-military relations.
Turkey’s government has consistently proclaimed that joining the EU is a top 
priority, though many in Turkey would say that Mr Erdoğan was never sincere in 
his commitment to accession. In any event his government shows less interest in 
accession today than it did several years ago.  Now that accession negotiations 
are blocked, Turkey is getting used to the idea that it may never be a member of 
the Union. 
If civil-military reforms were primarily a concession to Brussels, one would have 
expected them to have ground to a halt by now. But this has not happened. They 
are continuing or even accelerating. The Turkish government is following its own 
political reform agenda which does not necessarily correspond to that of Brussels. 
This shows that civil-military reforms have not been mainly driven by Turkey’s 
quest for EU accession. EU accession requirements have, however, helped and 
encouraged the Turkish government to push through difficult reforms  it wanted 
for its own reasons.
This author still remembers a conversation he had with the eminent scholar Üstün 
Ergüder of the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabancı University back in 2006. In those 
days most of us believed that we would one day see Turkey joining the EU. Professor 
Ergüder argued that the accession process was important not because Turkey 
absolutely needed to become an EU member state but mainly because this process 
would enable Turkey to carry out several difficult and much-needed reforms.
The Turkish General Staff is also in favor of EU accession, but not for exactly the 
same reasons as the Turkish government. Following Atatürk’s path, the Turkish 
military views itself as the vanguard of Turkey’s march towards Europe. It expects 
that European integration will safeguard, or at least help preserve, the secular and 
Western orientation of the country.  It also believed EU accession would prevent 





The Turkish military may have expected too much from EU accession. Justified 
or not, these expectations led the TSK for some time to strongly support the 
pursuit of EU-inspired reforms. However, despite this support, the march towards 
Europe halted. Additionally, it seems that there is no end in sight to the rule of 
the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) while the influence of 
conservative Islamist movements in 
Turkey is growing both in society and in 
state bodies. Under these conditions, 
one might expect TSK to take up its 
role as the guardian of Atatürk’s legacy 
with fresh vigor and determination. 
However, the military seems less and 
less able to perform its traditional role 
as the guardian of secularism in Turkey.
Metin Heper of Bilkent University in Ankara, a leading academic expert on civil-
military relations in Turkey, believes the military stepped back deliberately. In his 
analysis, the military seeks democracy as a goal, not as a means to pursue its 
Kemalist agenda. According to Heper, Atatürkism is no longer a fixed ideology 
to the TSK, but rather a kind of critical thinking. What is more, says Heper, the 
military’s “recent stance of being open to change brought the civil-military relations 
in Turkey close to those relations in liberal democracies. It seems from 2002 
onwards, the High Command has arrived at the conclusion that the military should 
no longer play a guardian role even if in its view civilians made a ‘mess of things’.”7
How the Primacy of Politics came about
The first big step meant to re-assert the power of the government and to diminish 
the political influence of the military was taken by a coalition government led 
by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of the Democratic Left Party (DSP). In 2001, 
Mr Ecevit’s administration amended the Constitution on a considerable number 
of points, changing among other things the composition of the National Security 
Council (MGK). Thus, civilians gained the majority of seats in the MGK while the 
status of the MGK’s recommendations was downgraded. In 2002, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power and further 
reduced the MGK’s influence. Its executive powers were abolished. Its chair was 
no longer reserved for a four-star general. Soon a civilian took over as Secretary 
General of the MGK.
Therefore, the landscape of Turkey’s defense establishment has changed since 
2004, shifting decision-making power away from the military. Previously, the MGK 
7 Metin Heper, “Civil Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?” Turkish Studies,  Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 252.
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had shaped national security policy under the TSK’s strong influence. Nowadays, 
however, the political responsibility for national security policy lies entirely with the 
Prime Minister to whom the Chief of Turkish General Staff reports in times of peace. 
In Turkey, the Ministry of National Defense is not the center of policy-making on 
defense and security issues. Nor does it provide political direction to the armed 
forces or appoint military commanders. This arrangement, unique in the Western 
world, is supposed to avoid the politicization of the military.
The MGK’s restructuring has probably been the most important reform in terms of 
enhancing the power of the government at the expense of the military.  However, it 
was not the only one. Other measures such as the removal of TSK representatives 
from the Council on Higher Education (YÖK) and the Supreme Board of Radio and 
Television (RTÜK) the abolition of State Security Courts composed of civilian and 
military judges responsible for trying soldiers and civilians charged with certain 
crimes. They were replaced by civilian Special Courts, which are also authorized 
to try soldiers for certain crimes.
According to the Constitution, the government appoints senior military commanders 
nominated by TSK. For a long time the government followed the choices put forth 
by the general staff. During the past few years, however, the government has 
rejected to appoint some candidates proposed by the military. 
General Özel’s bow to President Gül marks the end of the power struggle between 
the government and the military in Turkey. The military has lost. The declarations 
and the actions of leading generals show that the TSK has acknowledged the 
primacy of politics.
 
This does not mean that all Turkish officers have embraced civilian supremacy. Nor 
does it mean that the military leaders and the Turkish government will never clash 
again. Such clashes occur from time to time everywhere in the world. Occasionally, 
these conflicts will lead the Turkish government to make some concessions to the 
military, but most probably the politicians will not lose the upper hand. We will hear 
fewer declarations by the military on matters outside the domain of defense. This 
trend had already begun under General Başbuğ, who was chief of staff from 2008 
to 2010. 
Despite the fact that Prime Minister Erdoğan has defanged the army (as The 
Economist put it),8 he is now facing a growing challenge from the conservative 
Islamic movement led by the imam Fethullah Gülen. The question is no longer 
whether the Gülenists influence the police, the prosecutors and other state bodies 





behind the scenes. The relevant question now is how pervasive and strong their 
influence is. Wikileaks revealed a 2009 cable in which the then U.S. Ambassador 
to Turkey James F. Jeffrey said that claims about the alleged control of the national 
police by the Gülenists’ are “impossible to confirm, but we have found no one who 
disputes it.”9 Ahmet Şık, who has studied the Gülen movement in depth, admits he 
does not fully understand its role. In a letter from prison, he wrote: “‘Something’ has 
come to power in Turkey, but not sharia. 
I can’t name that ‘thing’ properly.”10 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s next power 
struggle is likely to be with his former 
allies, the Gülenists. This could lead to 
a clash between Erdoğan and Turkish 
President Abdullah Gül who is believed 
to be close to the Imam’s movement.
In the meantime, the government will undoubtedly continue consolidating 
its authority at the expense of the military which will eventually cease to be an 
autonomous actor in Turkish politics. This means that no more military coups 
d’état will take place in Turkey.
These are fundamental changes that affect Turkey’s political system. Ersel Aydınlı, 
a liberal scholar at Bilkent University, has described it as follows: “Society always 
has had a direct relationship with the army (which came to represent the ‘state’), 
and maintained a more fragile, secondary relationship with its politicians and 
politics (represented as the ‘government’). For most of Turkish society, the state 
took priority over the government.”11
This probably still applies, to a significant extent, today. Deep-seated beliefs and 
attitudes do not change rapidly. But while the Turks maintain their affection and 
respect for their army, they do not want it to overrule the elected government.
Sweeping Changes Announced and Deferred
On 1 September 2011, two days after Victory Day, the deputy chairman of the 
ruling AKP, Hüseyin Çelik, gave an interview to the newspaper Radikal. Mr Çelik 
summed up the government’s plans concerning the military in nine points. The first 
two were the subordination of the General Staff to the Defense Ministry and the 
9 “Turkey feels Sway of Reclusive Cleric in the U.S.”, The New York Times, 24 April 2012.
10 Quoted in Justin Vela, “Behind Bars in the Deep State” Foreign Policy, 11 January 2012.
11 Ersel Aydınlı, “A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 63,  
No. 4, p. 585.
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abolition of Article 35 of the Internal Service Code of the TSK, commonly seen as 
a tool for the military to intervene in politics.12
The European Commission has repeatedly urged Turkey to carry out these reforms. 
It is indeed desirable to do away with Article 35 of the Internal Service Code, not 
so much because it is dangerous, but because it is obsolete. It refers to a military 
and a Turkey that no longer exist.
The General Staff’s integration with the Ministry of National Defense would make 
a significant difference. Several Western European scholars are in favor of this 
reform. They argue that it would bring greater efficiency, better integration of 
civilian and military expertise, better consistency in security policy, and alignment 
with common practice in the EU and NATO states.13
Indeed, there is much to be said for placing the Turkish military under the authority 
of the Ministry of Defense. However, this is not obligatory for EU accession.
The political requirements for 
EU membership, laid down in 
the Copenhagen Criteria, do not 
prescribe any particular structure for 
the organization of defense. Instead, 
they require stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights, and respect for and 
protection of minorities. If Turkey can 
show that its civil-military relations are 
institutionalized in a democratic and 
durable way, that is good enough for the Copenhagen Criteria.
The acquis communautaire does not apply here. As a candidate country, Turkey 
must conform to EU practice and rules in many areas, but not in defense. It is not 
obliged to adopt what EU states consider best practice in civil-military relations.
Nonetheless, Turkey would do well to follow international best practice in this 
regard, and it seems a pity that the government has not yet carried out the 
integration of the General Staff with the Ministry of National Defense announced 
on 1 September 2011.
12  As reported in Today’s Zaman, 2 September 2011.
13  Jos Boonstra, “Higher Organisation of Defence: a Comparative Overview of Six European States: The Case for an Integrated Defence 
Organisation” in Sami Faltas and Sander Jansen, editors, Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey. Groningen: 
CESS, 2006, Chapter 6.
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the Copenhagen Criteria, do 
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The way Turkey has currently organized the formulation and execution of defense 
policy has several disadvantages. One of them is that it does not provide good 
conditions for civil direction of the military. 
The Prime Minister has many pressing responsibilities and has neither the time, 
nor the expertise and staff to give the General Staff daily political guidance, as 
Ministers of Defense do in Europe and NATO.
The Prime Ministry has a Secretariat General for Security Affairs that coordinates the 
making of security policy among the TSK, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Prime Ministry itself, and other government agencies. However, 
even now that it has lost its political power, the TSK continues to shape Turkish 
defense policy, virtually alone, under the political authority of the Prime Minister. 
No more than a handful of civilians, mostly in the Prime Ministry, are engaged in 
the formulation of defense policy. This means that the politician responsible for 
defense policy, i.e. the Prime Minister, is still heavily dependent on the expertise of 
the General Staff. This is all the more unfortunate considering the power struggle 
that went on for many years between the Premier and the military. 
This also means that the development of a consistent approach to defense and 
security for the government as a whole is even more difficult in Turkey than in other 
countries. Defense, law enforcement, and diplomacy are separate stovepipes. 
These limitations may be partially overcome if the General Staff is placed under 
the authority of the Ministry of National Defense, and if a significant core of civilian 
officials is recruited, employed and trained by this very Ministry to work shoulder to 
shoulder with the military officials. Thus the Ministry of National Defense may finally 
become the main locus of defense policy making. Additionally, for the purpose of 
political coherence, these civilians may bridge the various agencies engaged in the 
implementation of defense and security policies.
This would lead to greater effectiveness, efficiency, consistency, transparency and 
accountability in Turkish defense policy.
A Lack of Democratic Oversight
Democratic control of the military has two main pillars. The first, already discussed 
in this article, is the establishment of the civilian authority of a democratically 
elected politician over the armed forces The second is parliamentary control of 
all military and defense expenditures, which brings about the supervision of the 
government and the military by the parliament as well as by some other actors 
such as the media and civil society.
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Turkey has also made progress on this second pillar. Parliament has significantly 
increased the power of the Court of Accounts, (Sayıştay), to monitor how the TSK 
and the Ministry of National Defense make use of their budgets. . 
These improvements also enhance the power of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly to exercise its power of the purse. This is the only area where parliaments 
can truly be said to control the executive and in this case the defense establishment. 
Unless the defense establishment receives extra-budgetary funds, it cannot spend 
a single lira, euro or dollar without specific authorization from the parliament.
So far, the Turkish parliament has not used this control tool very actively. Other 
democratic parliaments consider the debate on the defense budget as the best 
opportunity to review defense equipment plans in detail but the TGNA does not.
Furthermore, the Turkish parliament has not been very active regarding other 
aspects of defense policy. An unpublished research by Bilkent University’s scholars 
shows that the standing committee of the Grand National Assembly began posing 
questions to the government and the TSK less than ten years ago, and its queries 
are still few and far between.
Very few media and civil society groups 
in Turkey show an active and sustained 
interest in defense and military policy. 
Unfortunately, they are not always able 
to do their work without harassment 
and intimidation. When the Turkish 
think tank TESEV published a detailed 
almanac of the Turkish security sector 
in 2005, charges were brought against 
some of the authors, though they were 
later dropped.14 In the same year, the 
Dutch-based Centre for European 
Security Studies, working with the 
Istanbul Policy Center and Bilkent University in Ankara, postponed the publication 
of a task force report on civil-military relations in Turkey because of hostile 
responses in Turkish media.15
Unless soldiers, journalists, scholars and others are able to speak freely, when they 
believe that their country is at risk, the democratic oversight of the security sector 
will remain inadequate. Democratic oversight depends on the rule of law.
14 http://www.tesev.org.tr/en/working-area/security-and-democracy
15 For CESS publications on Turkey, see www.cess.org/publications
“Unless soldiers, journalists, 
scholars and others are able 
to speak freely, when they 
believe that their country is at 
risk, the democratic oversight 






Turkey has many legitimate reasons to encourage and strengthen the oversight of 
the security sector by the Parliament, the media and civil society.  It is only then 
that Turkey will have full democratic control of the security sector, which is essential 
for democracy and security. As we have seen, the Turkish military are under civilian 
control today, but there are some doubts about political control of the police and 
other parts of the security sector. If police officers, acting under whatever influence, 
violate the rights of Turkish citizens, then the Minister responsible for the police 
must be made to answer for such wrongdoing in parliament. He will be required 
to explain how it could happen, what he has done about it, and how he intends to 
prevent the police from breaking the law again.
Democratic oversight of the security sector will also send the message to the 
European Union and the world that Turkey is completing its transition to full 
democracy. Finally, democratic oversight of the security sector will prevent the 
emergence of a new form of authoritarian rule that is based not on the power of 
the army but on the alliance of elected politicians with oblique, unelected, and 
unaccountable social movements.
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